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UNION AFFILIATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
In May of 1974, a majority of the members of National Oil
Workers Union (NOWU), Local 14, an independent labor organiza-
tion, voted to affiliate with the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers,
AFL-CIO (OCAW). In keeping with the local's bylaws, employees
who were not members of the union were not allowed to participate
in the voting. Questioning the existence of a certified bargaining
representative, the employer declared the collective bargaining
agreement void and discontinued dues deductions it had performed
pursuant to the contract. The union responded by charging the
employer with an illegal refusal to bargain, and the National Labor
Relations Board, in accordance with its policy of honoring privately
conducted union-affiliation elections that satisfy specified standards,
found the employer guilty.' In Amoco Production Co.,2 a subse-
quent decision in the same case, a divided Board held that the
union's decision to exclude nonmembers from voting in the affilia-
tion election did not invalidate the election nor did it absolve the
employer of the duty to observe its contractual obligations. By so
ruling, the Board explicitly overturned its decision in Jasper Seating
Co.,3 issued only sixteen months before, in which it had declined to
recognize an affiliation because nonmembers had not been given an
equal opportunity to vote in the affiliation election.
4
' Amoco Prod. Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 861 (1975).
2239 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (Jan. 3, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th
Cir. Feb. 13, 1978). For a fuller discussion of the facts and procedural history of
Amoco and the four opinions written by the various Board members, see notes
26-59 infra & accompanying text. The citation above correctly indicates that the
petition for review was docketed nearly a year before the third and final Board
decision. The petition filed by Amoco was for review of the second decision,
Amoco Prod. Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 158 (1977). In 1978, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit granted the NLBB's request to withdraw the record and recon-
sider the case. The NLRB affirmed its earlier decision on January 3, 1979, and
returned the record to the court. A Fifth Circuit panel heard oral argument on
October 16, 1979. See text accompanying notes 39-44 infra.
3231 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977).
4 In Jasper Seating, id., 35 union members voted in favor of affiliation, and
three voted against. The nonmembers excluded from voting numbered 38, enough
to have changed the outcome of the election. Although the number of ineligible
employees in Amoco was too small to have affected the result, the Board expressly
chose not to rest its holding on that fact. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 5
(Jan. 3, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978). But in
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 183 (Jan. 3, 1979), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1104 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1979), a companion case to Amoco, a panel of
the Board upheld a union-conducted affiliation election even though the excluded
employees outnumbered those actually voting in favor of affiliation by more than
three to one.
In two affiliation cases since Amoco, the Board has followed its Amoco ruling
and dismissed employer objections based on the ineligibility of nonmembers. Provi-
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The affiliation of an independent with an international union,
the scenario in Amoco, is but one of many ways in which labor
organizations alter their structures and alignments in response to
changing economic and political conditions. At the topmost level,
there is occasional movement of the giant, overarching parent organ-
izations-for example, the merger of the AFL and the CIO. Inter-
national unions may shift affiliations among federations 6 and may
merge or divide to form new internationals.7 At the local level,
affiliation 8 and disaffiliation 9 with an international, merger of one
local into another,10 creation of a new local from part of an old
local,'. and amalgamation of several locals into a new one 12 are
everyday events. Changes at all strata of union organization are a
constant on the labor scene that must be accommodated in a sensible
manner by national labor policy.
dence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (July 27, 1979), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1979); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 241 N.L.R.B. No.
116 (Apr. 5, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7157 (9th Cir. May 29, 1979).
5 See generally A. GoLBEIIO, AFL-CIO: LABOR UNiTED (1956).
6 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pearson Candy Co., 471 F.2d 11 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); NLRB v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 276 F.2d 865 (7th Cir.
1960); Continental Oil Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1940).
7 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108 (1st Cir. 1975);
NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. v. NLRB, 244 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1957) (per curiam); Dickey v.
NLRB, 217 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1954); Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No.
183 (Jan. 3, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 78-1104 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1979);
American Enka Co., Div. of Akzona, Inc., 231 N.L.B.B. 1335 (1977).
8 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. NLB, 576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Harris-Woodson Co., 179 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1950); Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B.
1398 (1976); Bear Archery, Div. of Victor Comptometer Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1169
(1976), enforcement denied by order, 587 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1977); Independent
Drug Store Owners, 211 N.L.R.B. 701 (1974), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Retail
Store Employees Local 428 v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1975); Hamilton
Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971); North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942 (1967);
Weatherhead Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1266 (1953).
9 See, e.g., J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLBB, 571 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); Illinois Grain Corp., 222 N.L.R.B. 495 (1976);
Supak & Sons Mfg. Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 1228 (1971), enforced per curiam, 470
F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1973); Waterway Terminals Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1788 (1958);
Wagner Elec. Corp., 91 N.L.R.B. 220 (1950).
10 See, e.g., NLRB v. Newspapers, Inc., 515 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1975); NLRB
v. Canton Sign Co., 457 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1972); Samuel P. Katz, 231 N.L.R.B.
1194 (1977); William B. Tanner Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 566 (1974), enforcement
denied per curiam, 517 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1975); F.W. Woolworth Co., 194
N.L.R.B. 1208 (1972); United States Gypsum Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 931 (1967);
Gulf Oil Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 184 (1962); Missouri Serv. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1142
(1949).
11 See, e.g., Climax Molybdenum Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 508 (1964). This type
of structural change occurred in NOWU, Local 14, prior to the events that gave
rise to Amoco. See note 27 infra.
12 See, e.g., NLBB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974);
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n. v. NLBB, 373 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Kentucky Power
Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 730 (1974).
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These fluctuations in union structure raise questions that some-
times find their way to the National Labor Relations Board, most
often in refusal to bargain cases brought under section 8(a)(5) of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),3 and in amendment of
certification cases. The former arise when, subsequent to an affilia-
tion or merger, the employer refuses to recognize or bargain with
the newly formed union and the union responds by filing an unfair
labor practice charge. 14 The latter cases involve a union's petition
to amend its certification to reflect a change in name or affiliation. 15
In either procedural posture, the same substantive law applies: 16
if the affiliation or merger complies with the standards developed
by the Board and the courts, the new union succeeds to its prede-
cessor's bargaining rights; 17 if not, the employer has no duty to
recognize the successor union nor to fulfill any obligations towards
it under the collective agreement.'
13 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1976).
14 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler N.E. Co., 540 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1976);
Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 909 (1957); St. Vincent Hosp., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 208 (Sept. 29, 1978);
Samuel P. Katz, 231 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1977).
15 See, e.g., Jasper Seating Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977); Gas Serv. Co.,
213 N.L.R.B. 932 (1974); Missouri Beef Packers, 175 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1969);
Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 311 (1968); Emery Indus., Inc., 148
N.L.R.B. 51 (1964).
In Cocker Saw Co. v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1971), the employer filed
a petition to amend a union's certification, claiming that a newly formed inde-
pendent, not the certified representative, had the support of the majority of the
employees. The petition was dismissed. In no other case found did an employer
petition to amend a certification.
1e Retail Store Employees Local 428 v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); Newspapers, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 8, 9 nn.2 & 4, 10 n.13
(1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1975).
17 See, e.g., NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974);
Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398 (1976).
' 8 American Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir.
1972); Factory Serv., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 722 (1971).
The question of the validity of an affiliation or merger has also been raised
in motions to amend and enforce outstanding bargaining orders, see William B.
Tanner Co. v. NLBB, 517 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1975); Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp. v. NLBB, 244 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co.,
179 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1950); and petitions by the employer, employees, or a
competing union requesting a Board-conducted representation or decertification
election, see Fluhrer Bakeries, 232 N.L.B.B. 212 (1977) (employees' petition);
Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1967) (employer's petition);
Waterway Terminals Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1788 (1958) (employer's petition); New
Jersey Oyster Planters & Packers Ass'n, 101 N.L.R.B. 538 (1952) (intervening
union's petition). The invalidity of a merger has also been raised, with ultimate
success, as a defense to prior, unrelated unfair labor practices. Dickey v. NLRB,
217 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1954) (denying enforcement of order to bargain with
successor union). An employer's attempt to seek an adjudication of a merged
union's bargaining rights in federal court under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1976), failed for lack of jurisdiction. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v.
Textile Workers Union, 559 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
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To say that the Board's decisions in this area have been incon-
sistent would be a generous understatement, and the four opinions
in Amoco do not portend a final resolution to the see-sawing on the
issue of voter eligibility. Although one could not dismiss lightly
an analysis that attributed these vacillations to shifts in the political
and ideological make-up of the Board,19 such constant inconstancy
may well indicate a problem that lies deeper than the identity of
the decisionmakers.
In affiliation cases, and in union-successorship cases in general,
the Board faces the difficult task of reconciling the two partly in-
consistent goals of guaranteeing employees their free choice of
bargaining representative and fostering stable collective bargaining
relationships. 20 Each of these policies is embodied in a set of Board
standards for review of affiliations. Corresponding to the concern
with stability is a test for "continuity of representation," by which
the Board seeks to determine whether replacement by the successor
union disrupts the bargaining relationship established by its prede-
cessor.21 Second, the Board requires, consistent with the policy of
free choice, that the election procedure be conducted in accordance
with minimal standards of "due process" so that the outcome ac-
curately reflects the employees' true desires.22 If either continuity
of representation or due process is lacking, the Board will ordinarily
invalidate the affiliation election. 23
This sharp separation of the fundamental policy concerns into
two distinct tests may be commended because, at least in theory, it
makes for administrative simplicity. In practice, however, the tests
have not been applied independently. Rather, the Board's decisions
give evidence of a tension between the two standards that renders
the outcome of every case unpredictable and inexplicable.
Part I of this Comment explores the interplay between the
continuity of representation doctrine and due process standards
'9 Board Member Peter D. Walther, who voted with the majority in the 3-2
decision in jasper Seating, 231 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977)-a decision which over-
turned precedent of long standing-was replaced in 1977 by Member John C.
Truesdale, whose concurring opinion was decisive in the Amoco majority's over-
ruling of jasper Seating. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (Jan. 3, 1979). A similar se-
quence of events occurred with respect to the Board's attitude toward misrepresen-
tations in election campaigns: The Board's long-standing rule, announced in Holly-
wood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962), and discarded in Shopping Kart
Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977), has recently been restored in
General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Dec. 6, 1978).
20 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971) (Miller, Ch., concurring).
21 See part H, comprising text accompanying notes 60-123 infra.
22 See part III, comprising text accompanying notes 124-80 infra.
23North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 942 (1967).
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by examining the facts and opinions in Amoco. Part II criticizes
the doctrine of continuity of representation as currently applied by
the Board and the courts, and offers a revised interpretation of
continuity that restores its central function of guaranteeing stability
in collective bargaining relationships.2 Part III reviews the Board's
due process standards for union-run elections and concludes that
unions should not be required to allow nonmembers to vote in
affiliation elections.2
I. AMoco PRODUCTION CO.
The origins of the controversy in Amoco can be traced to
1972, when the National Oil Workers Union (NOWU), a national
union, was dissolved.26 The NOWU National Board of Directors
urged NOWU locals to affiliate with the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO (OCAW), but the mem-
bers of the Houston unit of NOWU, Local 14, rejecting that advice,
decided instead to operate as an independent union.27  By early
1974, the officers and members of Local 14 were reconsidering their
choice. A straw poll, taken by mail after meetings with represent-
atives of OCAW, indicated that 216 members favored joining
OCAW, while sixty were opposed.28 On April 3, the local's Board
of Directors unanimously agreed to proceed with a formal affilia-
tion election. Prior to the vote, nine meetings on the issue were
conducted by the local, with OCAW officials present to answer
questions. Notices of the meetings were posted. Nonmembers were
permitted to attend and participate in the discussion, but were
told they would be ineligible to vote unless they signed dues deduc-
24 See part II, comprising text accompanying notes 60-123 infra.
25 See part III, comprising text accompanying notes 124-80 infra.
26 The account that follows is taken largely from the administrative law judge's
opinion in the original unfair labor practice hearing, reported in Amoco Prod. Co., 220
N.L.R.B. 861 (1975). For the history of the Amoco proceedings, see text accom-
panying notes 33-45 infra. Two other sources useful for the information they
contained on the background of the case were Brief for Respondent and Supplemental
Brief for Petitioner, Amoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir., docketed
Feb. 13, 1978). When relied on, these sources are noted.
27 Brie for Respondent at 6, Amoco Prod. Co. v. NLBB, No. 78-1042 (5th
Cir., docketed Feb. 13, 1978). In 1972, the membership twice voted to reject
affiliation with OCAW. Id. On the first vote, affiliation was voted down, 157-160;
the second vote was 163-169. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 6 n.3, Amoco
Prod. Co. v. NLRB, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir., docketed Feb. 13, 1978).
NOWU, Local 14, originally represented two units, the Houston unit that was
involved in Amoco and a New Orleans unit. Id. 6. Following the dissolution of
NOWU as a national union, the New Orleans unit split from Local 14 and unsuccess-
fully attempted to form a separate local.
28220 N.L.R.B. 861, 862 (1975).
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tion forms, which some of them did. The election was conducted
by mail, and provisions were made for the security of the ballots.
The tabulation showed 214 members for affiliation with OCAW
and seventy-one against. 29 Nonmembers excluded from participa-
tion in the voting numbered ninety-seven, too few to have possibly
affected the outcome.30 The Board of Directors then adopted and
sent a resolution to Amoco, notifying the employer of the change
and of the local's intention to continue as bargaining representative
under its new name, Local 4-14, OCAW. With one exception, all
members of independent Local 14's Board of Directors assumed
the corresponding posts in the new OCAW local.31
The employer responded four months later by sending to each
employee in the bargaining unit a letter announcing that dues de-
ductions were discontinued, that the collective bargaining agree-
ment with the former independent union was void, but that, as a
matter of policy, the company would voluntarily carry out those
provisions of the contract applicable to individuals. All parts of
the contract pertaining to the rights of the union, such as the arbi-
tration and dues checkoff clauses, were specifically repudiated.
32
Amoco then filed a petition with the NLRB for a representation
election, a petition that was blocked when the union answered with
an unfair labor practice charge.33
In the original proceedings the administrative law judge found
Amoco guilty of violating sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act.
He dismissed the employer's objection to the exclusion of non-
members on the grounds that their votes could not have affected the
outcome of the election, that all unit employees had had the oppor-
tunity to join the union, that no other union, no local officers, nor
any unit employees had objected to the affiliation, and that no
serious irregularities had tainted the conduct of the election.m
Finding that the independent Local 14 no longer existed, the judge
29 Id. 863. Amoco, alleging irregularities in the determination of eligible voters
and in the tabulation of votes, has argued that those votes are suspect. Supplemental
Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Amoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir.,
docketed Feb. 13, 1978).
30220 N.L.R.B. 861, 864 (1975).
31 The local President had been promoted to a supervisory position with Amoco
and thus was no longer a union member. The local Vice President became president
of OCAW, Local 4-14. Id. 863.
32 Id. 863-64.
33 Id. 862.
34Amoco Prod. Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 861, 861-65 (1975) (decision of Adminis-
trative Law Judge Bernard J. Seff).
3Z Id. 864.
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was persuaded that unless Amoco was ordered to bargain with
OCAW, Local 4-14, the employees would have lost their right to
representation merely because they voted to affiliate with an inter-
national union.36
A divided panel of the Board affirmed the judge's rulings, with
Member Jenkins dissenting over the ineligibility of the 97 non-
members.3 7
In a second proceeding 8 two years later, a panel of the Board
unanimously issued a supplemental decision upholding the admin-
istrative law judge's enforcement of an order requiring Amoco to
reimburse the union for $45,750 plus interest in uncollected dues.
Amoco filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit for review of the Board decision,39 and the NLRB responded
with a cross-application for enforcement. 4 On June 22, 1978, the
court granted the Board's motion to withdraw the record on re-
view.41 The Board notified the parties of its intention to reconsider
its decision and invited written statements of position. In a 3-2
decision that elicited four opinions, 42 the Board then affirmed its
prior decision and found that "union affiliation votes limited to
union members are valid," 43 this time expressly declining to rely
on the fact that the non-member votes could not have changed the
result of the election.4 4 The record has been returned to the court
of appeals, which is now reviewing the case.
45
The major premise of the plurality opinion, signed by Chair-
man Fanning and Member Murphy, was that union decisions to
affiliate or merge are fundamentally internal, organizational matters
involving neither the employment relation nor the representational
status of employees.46  Wages, benefits, and working conditions are
unaffected, and the collective bargaining agreement remains in
36 Id. 865.
37Id. 861.
3 8 Amoco Prod. Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 158 (1977).
39 Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 4, Amoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB, No.
78-1042 (5th Cir., docketed Feb. 13, 1978).
40 Id.
41 Id.
4 2Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (Jan. 3, 1979), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
43 Id., slip op. at 2.
44 Id. 5.
45 Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 5, Amoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB, No.
78-1042 (5th Cir., docketed Feb. 13, 1978).
46 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 3, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
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force.4 7 As with strike votes, contract ratifications, and elections for
stewards, officers, and negotiating committees, the decision to limit
participation in an affiliation election to union members only is
strictly the union's business and not the Board's. The union must,
however, conduct the election with adequate procedural safeguards,
including proper notice to all members, an orderly vote, and some
reasonable precautions to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.48  The
plurality, finding these conditions satisfied, observed that adequate
discussion and time for reflection had been provided prior to the
election, that meetings to discuss the affiliation had been open to
members and nonmembers alike, and that nonmembers could have
become eligible to vote by signing dues-authorization forms.49 The
plurality also noted that even if all ninety-seven excluded non-
members had voted against affiliation, the outcome of the election
would not have been altered. They asserted, however, that this
was "not dispositive of the issue." 50
Member Truesdale concurred, basing his decision on the ground
that affiliation is a matter of "exclusive concern" to union members,
and expressly disclaiming reliance on the ability of nonmembers to
attend discussion meetings and to join the union up to the last
minute.51 He agreed with the plurality view that the election had
been conducted with sufficient regard for due process.
52
47 Id. 3.
48 Id. 4-5.
49 Id. In Providence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (July 27, 1979),
appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1979), the eligibility list for the
election, held in May, was compiled on the basis of dues records for the first quarter
of the year, effectively precluding nonmembers from joining for the purpose of
voting. Id., slip op. at 8 (Jenkins, M., dissenting in part). The majority, adhering
to Amoco, dismissed this problem with the observation that the record contained no
assertion "that any unit employee desiring membership was refused." Id. 4.50 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 5 (Jan. 3, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
' Id. 7 (Truesdale, M., concurring). Both the members of the plurality and
Member Truesdale observed that affiliation does not result in "the dissolution of an
already existing" labor organization Id. 2, 8. In Providence Medical Center, 243
N.L.R.B. No. 61 (July 27, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (9th Cir. Sept. 10,
1979), this reservation was repeated. Id., slip op. at 3. Although perhaps innocent
enough, these remarks may indicate that the Board would reach a different result
on the issue of nonmember eligibility in cases in which the affiliate "swallows up"
the former independent. See text acompanying notes 150-52 infra. Both Chairman
Fanning and Member Murphy, co-authors of the Amoco plurality opinion, appear
to feel that dissolution of the predecessor union does not invalidate an affiliation or
merger. See Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398 (1976); Independent Drug Store
Owners, 211 N.L.R.B. 701 (1974) (Fanning, M., dissenting), aff'd per curiam
sub nom. Retail Store Employees Local 428 v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.
1975). See text accompanying notes 96-101 infra.
52 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 9 (Jan. 3, 1979)
(Truesdale, M., concurring), appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13,
1979).
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In dissent, Member Jenkins adhered to his opinion, set forth
in earlier cases, 53 that exclusion of nonmembers from an affiliation
election violates minimum standards of due process.5r Emphasizing
the impact of an affiliation election on all employees in the bargain-
ing unit, Member Jenkins declared that a union membership re-
quirement in an affiliation election was just as inappropriate as it
would be in a Board-conducted representation election.15
Member Penello based his separate dissent on his view that the
affiliation resulted in a substantial change in the bargaining repre-
sentative's identity, raising a question concerning representation that
could be resolved only by a Board-conducted election in which all
employees-union members and nonmembers alike-would be eli-
gible to vote.56 Relying on the opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in American Bridge Div., United States Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 57 Member Penello concluded that the affiliation of
the 380-member independent with the 200,000-member international
and the acceptance by the local of the international's constitution
had altered the rights and obligations of all the employees in the
unit, extinguishing the local's autonomy.58
Because the plurality and concurring opinions differ only in
minor respects, they may be treated, for purposes of this discussion,
as expressing a single majority view. Although Member Jenkins
53 Jasper Seating Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977); North Elec. Co., 165
N.L.R.B. 942 (1967) (Jenkins, M., dissenting).
54 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 10 (Jan. 3, 1979)
(Jenkins, M., dissenting), appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
551d. A fuller and more recent exposition of Member Jenkins's views is pro-
vided in his dissent in Providence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. No. 61, slip op.
at 7 (July 27, 1979) (Jenkins, M., dissenting), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366
(9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1979).
56 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 11 (Jan. 3, 1979)
(Penello, M., dissenting), appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1979).
Member Pennello has since expressed the view that nonmembers of the union must
be eligible to vote in affiliation cases in which a Board-conducted election is not
required. Providence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. No. 61, slip op. at 12 (July 27,
1979) (Penello, M., dissenting), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (9th Cir. Sept.
10, 1979).
57457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972).
58Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 11-12 (Jan. 3, 1979)
(Penello, M., dissenting), appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
Member Penello did not indicate what differences between the constitutions of
NOWU, Local 14, and OCAW, Local 4-14, led him to conclude that the locars
autonomy had been destroyed. The issue was never addressed in the prior opinions,
but apparently had been raised by Amoco. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 11,
Amoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir., docketed Feb. 13, 1978).
Amoco argued that the constitutions differed substantially with respect to the scope
of union purpose, initiation fees, discipline of members, dues, strike procedures,
amendment of bylaws, and removal of local officers. Id. 11-13.
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wrote in dissent, his views substantially coincide with those of the
majority. All four members agree that the affiliation of a small in-
dependent union with a powerful international does not present a
question concerning representation nor does it require a Board-
conducted election. They further agree that such an affiliation is
valid if the election procedures accord with standards of due process.
Their dispute concerns only the question whether due process re-
quires that nonmembers of the union be eligible to vote. By con-
trast, Member Penello's dissent rejected the affiliation on an entirely
distinct and independent ground-lack of continuity of repre-
sentation.
Of the four opinions in Amoco, Member Jenkins's is perhaps
the least compelling on its face. If continuity of representation is
preserved and the identity of the bargaining representative is not
changed substantially, why should nonmembers be permitted to vote
on an internal union question that does not seriously alter their
representational status? Member Jenkins's conclusion that affilia-
tion has a significant impact on all bargaining unit employees and
his resort to the analogy between Board-conducted representation
elections and union-run affiliation votes, tend to contradict the as-
sumptions he did not question in Amoco-that the bargaining repre-
sentative did not change and that no question concerning repre-
sentation existed.
Member Jenkins's position appears somewhat more sensible,
however, if he is read, on the one hand, as acquiescing in the
dubious fiction that the bargaining representative was unchanged
by the affiliation, and, on the other, as compensating for the very
real transformation of the independent by demanding voting pro-
cedures that approach compliance with the Board's high standards
for representation elections. Because, contrary to the fiction of con-
tinuity, an important change in all the employees' representational
status was actually at stake in the Local 14 affiliation vote, Member
Jenkins would have required that all employees in the bargaining
unit be eligible to participate, just as they would be in a Board-
conducted representation election.
The tension found in Member Jenkins's dissent between the
continuity of representation doctrine and due process standards is
discernible as well in the opinions of the majority. If an affiliation
election is exclusively an internal union matter, no different than
a strike or contract ratification vote, then the Board has no business
reviewing the election procedure for adequate notice, time for
reflection and discussion, and secrecy. There is no reason to require
197/9]
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an election at all; 59 the union ought to be free to decide the ques-
tion however it sees fit. The majority's insistence on an election
with procedures that comport with due process indicates that, like
Member Jenkins, the majority does not fully credit the continuity
doctrine. Unlike the dissenter, however, the majority would not
tighten the due process requirements so far as to require that non-
members be allowed to vote. In order to assess the correctness of
these two views, or of Member Penello's opinion that a legally sig-
nificant change took place in the identity of the bargaining repre-
sentative, it is necessary to inquire further into the Board's doctrine
of continuity of representation.
II. THE CONTINUITY OF REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE
This part advances the thesis that the Board and the courts
have unnecessarily infused into the concept of continuity of repre-
sentation a metaphysical concern over the identity of the bargaining
representative. This confusion is traced to two distinct sources: an
unduly cramped reading of the Board's freedom under the statute
and a failure to scrutinize inherited common law doctrines in the
light of the policies of the Act. Although the Board in practice
has tempered the ill effects of its sins with a healthy disregard
for its own doctrine, the potential for disaster has been fully realized
in a trio of cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which has entered the lists of metaphysics with an awesome
vengeance. Once stripped of metaphysical trappings, the continuity
doctrine emerges well-suited for its important role of promoting
stability in collective bargaining relationships.
A. The Continuity Doctrine and the NLRA
Under the authority of section 9(c)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act,60 the Board conducts representation and decertifica-
tion elections upon petition, if an investigation finds that a "ques-
tion concerning representation" exists. In order to promote stability
in collective bargaining relationships, the Board has developed rules
for the timeliness of election petitions. Generally, the Board will
not entertain a petition received within one year of a valid election,
59 The Board and the courts have occasionally recognized mergers although no
vote had been taken. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 655 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Climax Molybdenum Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 508 (1964); Bushnell Steel Co.,
96 N.L.R.B. 218 (1951); Cadillac Auto. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 460 (1950); Missouri
Serv. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1142 (1949).
6029 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
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within one year of a certification, or during the life of a collective
bargaining agreement.61
The Board's practice of giving effect to union-run affiliation
elections constitutes an alternative to the statutory procedures that
must be reconciled with the Act. In the Board's catechism, this
accommodation is reached through the doctrine that an affiliation
that preserves continuity of representation does not materially
alter the identity of the bargaining representative and therefore
does not raise a question concerning representation; because it is a
change in name or affiliation only, it does not require a section
9(c)(1) election conducted by the Board.6 2 Provided that the affilia-
tion-election procedure satisfies the standards of due process, the
Board, upon validation of the results, will require the employer to
continue to observe its contractual obligations to the union as if no
change had occurred. Conversely, if an affiliation does not preserve
continuity of representation, it raises a question concerning repre-
sentation that can be resolved only by a Board-conducted election.
Until the union establishes its majority in accordance with the statu-
tory procedure, the employer is free to repudiate the contract and
need not recognize the successor.
An important consequence of these canons is that the Board's
rules for the timeliness of elections, adopted for petitions raising
questions concerning representation, do not apply to union-con-
ducted affiliation and merger votes.63 A finding of continuity thus
serves, in effect, to lift the election-year, certification-year, and con-
tract bars.64 This means that in Amoco, for example, had OCAW
61 Section 9(c) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)
(1976), specifically prohibits representation or decertification elections in a bargain-
ing unit within twelve months of a valid election. In addition, the Board has
established two other bars to elections. Under the first, the certification-year bar,
election petitions are dismissed if filed fewer than twelve months after a union
victorious in an election has been certified. See B. GoPAM, BAsic TX- oN LAEoR
LAw 53-54 (1976). The Supreme Court approved the Board's rule in Brooks v.
NLEB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). Another such rule is the contract bar, which, roughly
speaking, prevents elections during the life of a collective agreement. See R.
GowzAw, supra at 54-55. As long as the term of the contract is reasonable,
generally three years or fewer, the Board will usually not conduct representation
elections until the contract period nears its end. Id. Under certain conditions the
rule is not given effect. Id. 55-59. (For instance, when there is a schism in a
union, an election will be permitted. St. Louis Bakery Employers Labor Council,
121 N.L.R.B. 1548 (1958). See notes 70 & 71 infra & accompanying text. In
contrast, the Board's view is that a valid affiliation leaves the contract bar intact.
Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 573 (1971).)
62Retail Store Employees Local 428 v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 942 (1967).
63 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 573 (1971).
4 See note 61 supra.
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petitioned the Board for a decertification election, the collective
bargaining agreement between the independent union and the
employer would have acted as a bar until the contract was expiring,
some two years later.65 By voting on their own to affiliate with
OCAW, however, the members of the independent local quickly
accomplished a similar result, without having to comply with the
Board's much more stringent election procedures.
66
The Board's doctrinal accommodation of its practice to the
mandate of section 9(c)(1) is much more restrictive than it needs to
be. The basic premise-that a change in the identity of an existing
bargaining representative necessarily raises a question concerning
representation-finds no support in the statute. Under the provi-
sions of section 9 (c)(1) for decertification petitions, a question con-
cerning representation does not arise unless the majority status of
the incumbent union is affirmatively challenged.67 Only if it is
presumed that a change in the representative's identity automatically
casts its majority support into doubt, does it follow that a question
concerning representation is raised. But it is precisely that pre-
sumption which is belied by the facts of the typical affiliation effort.
A successful affiliation vote means that a majority of the member-
ship of the incumbent union has expressed support for the new,
affiliated local. Moreover, it is the incumbent union's elected lead-
65 Under § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1976),
either the bargaining unit employees on their own, or OCAW in their behalf, could
have petitioned the Board for an election to decertify NOWU, Local 14. If OCAW
had petitioned, it would have been included on the ballot; if a majority of the
eligible employees voting had chosen it, OCAW would have been certified by the
Board as the new bargaining representative, and NOWU, Local 14, would have
lost its certification. The Board's contract-bar rule, however, would have presented
an obstacle to any petition to decertify while the collective bargaining agreement
was still in effect. See note 61 supra. For decertification procedures generally, see
R. GonmAM, supra note 61, at 49-52.
66 See Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 576 (1971) (Miller, Ch., con-
curring).
67 Section 9( c) ( 1 ) (A) (ii) requires a decertification petition filed by employees
or by a union in their behalf to "assert that the individual or labor organization,
which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the
bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in section 9(a)."
29 U.S.C. §159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1956). A "representative as defined in section
9(a)" is a majority representative.
Section 9(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §159(c)(1)(B) (1976), which permits the
employer to file a petition when presented with a demand for recognition, contains
no express requirement that the petition allege a question concerning the union's
majority support. But in United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (1966).
the Board overturned its earlier decisions and held that an employer's petition to
decertify an incumbent union must be based on objective evidence supporting a
reasonable belief that the incumbent lacks majority support. Thus, whether initi-
ated by an employer or by employees, petitions to decertify an incumbent union
must raise the question of the incumbent's loss of majority support.
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ership that ordinarily proposes the affiliation and sets the election
machinery in motion. Assuming that the election procedures ac-
cord with due process 68 and that the predecessor union does not
remain in existence and dispute the successor's claim to majority
status, 9 the election does not leave the successor union's majority
status open to doubt and does not raise a question concerning
representation under section 9(c)(1). Nor, once it is established
that the Board's practice of crediting union-run affiliation elections
does not contravene the Act, can there be much question of the
Board's authority for doing so as a matter of administrative dis-
cretion.
According to this revised view of the Board's freedom under
the statute, the doctrine of continuity need no longer focus on the
irrelevant issue of change in the bargaining representative's identity.
The essence of continuity of representation is uninterrupted gov-
ernance by the law of the shop as expressed in the collective bargain-
ing agreement. This understanding of continuity is borne out by
the Board's consistent application of two requirements, both rooted
in the basic policy of fostering stability in collective bargaining
relationships. According to the first, when competing union fac-
tions lay claim to the title of bargaining representative, the attendant
confusion and disruption of labor peace can be resolved only by a
Board-conducted election, with all its safeguards.70 This branch
of the continuity doctrine precludes recognition of affiliations and
mergers in which a "schism" arises because of the continued ex-
istence of the predecessor union and its active opposition to the
change.71
68 See text accompanying notes 124-180 infra.
69 See notes 70 & 71 infra & accompanying text.
70 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971); Universal Tool & Stamping
Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 254 (1970); North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942 (1967); Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 419 (1963).
71The Board's "schism" doctrine has been articulated primarily as an ex-
ception to the contract-bar rule. See Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901
(1958), enforcement denied, 297 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1961). See generalbl Feldes-
man, Contract Bar to Representation Elections, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 450 (1960);
Naumoff, The New NLRB Contract Bar Rules, 12 N.Y.U. CorF. LABOR 253 (1969);
Samoff & H. Summers, Disafiliation, 1 LAB. L.J. 585 (1950); C. Summers, Union
Schism in Perspective: Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards, and Projected Answers,
45 VA. L. REv. 261, 269-74 (1959). The Board consistently disapproves mergers
or affiliations tainted by schism. See Illinois Grain Corp., 222 N.LR.B. 495
(1976); Missouri Beef Packers, 175 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1969); Bedford Gear & Mach.
Prods., Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 1 (1964); R.M. Hollingshead Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 840
(1955); Weatherhead Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1266 (1953); Wagner Elec. Corp., 91
N.L.R.B. 220 (1950).
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The second requirement is that the successor union honor the
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement with the employer.72
This condition follows from the inapplicability of the contract bar
to mergers and affiliations. If a newly affiliated local were free to
repudiate an existing contract, affiliation would become a means for
subverting the Board's contract-bar policy, with detrimental effects
on labor-relations stability.
Underlying both of these requirements is a deep concern with
the effect of the affiliation on administration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement already in place. When a schism occurs, the
employer is in a quandary because it cannot tell which faction has
the right to administer the contract on behalf of the employees.
No matter which union it chooses to treat as the legitimate employee
representative, the other will protest and the labor peace for which
the employer bargained will be lost. The same result obtains in
the absence of a schism if the successor union repudiates the con-
tract. Thus, both requirements are designed to safeguard the exist-
ing collective bargaining agreement. 73
A definition of continuity of representation that exceeds these
two requirements is neither mandated by the Act nor consistent
with its policies. Nevertheless, there are now at least a dozen indicia
of "continuity" regularly adverted to in the opinions of the Board
and courts. Although it is not at all clear which, if any, of these
criteria rise to the status of necessary conditions, the most commonly
72 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971).
73 A third requirement, also related to the policy of stability, can be found in
the Board's consistent refusal to entertain during the certification year amendment
of certification petitions from unions that were defeated in the election conducted
by the Board. Mosler Safe Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 934 (1974); United Hydraulics
Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 62 (1973); Bunker Hill Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 334 (1972); Bed-
ford Gear & Mach. Prods., Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 1 (1964); Gulf Oil Corp., 109
N.L.R.B. 861 (1954). The Board apparently believes that amendment of certifica-
tion in this situation would negate the results of its earlier election and subvert the
policies of the Act. United Hydraulics Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. at 62.
The Board's practice here is not inconsistent with its recognition of affiliations
during the certification year with unions that did not appear on the ballot in the
representation election, see, e.g., Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398 (1976);
Emery Indus., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 51 (1964); or with its decisions to grant a union
that lost the representation election an amendment of certification after the expira-
tion of the certification year, see, e.g., North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942 (1967).
The policy underlying the certification-year bar, see note 61 supra, would be vio-
lated if the loser in the representation election were able to gain representation
rights by the affiliation route. If that practice were allowed, certification would
not have its intended stabilizing effect as a final decision laying the opposing claims
of competing unions to rest. The losing union would instead be encouraged to
continue its efforts to rally the support of the bargaining unit employees. These
same concerns are not present once the certification year ends, and are much less
urgent, if present, when the union with whom affiliation is sought was not involved
at all in the representation election.
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cited are retention of the predecessor union's leadership and preser-
vation of its autonomy.74 Among the other factors are the change,
or lack of change, in the union membership,75 the dues structure,76
the constitution and bylaws,77 the rights and obligations of union
members,78 the day-to-day relations between the union and the
employer,7 9 the mode of grievance processing, 0 the identity of the
union negotiator,81 and the use of the predecessor union's books,
accounts, property, and address.8 2 These indicators are applied as if
the relevant inquiry were not continuity of representation in the
sense of stability, but rather in the sense of metaphysical identity sa3
The excess baggage of the continuity doctrine is attributable, in
part, to the Board's unduly restrictive reading of its statutory au-
thority. An historical inquiry reveals a second source in the un-
examined legacy of the common law.
B. Common Law Origins of the Continuity Doctrine
The origins of this metaphysical approach 8 4 to continuity of
representation can be traced to early cases in which the Board and
74 E.g., J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); Retail Store Employees Local 428 v. NLRB, 528
F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Good Hope Indus., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B.
No. 90 (Dec. 6, 1978); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 134
(Aug. 25, 1978); Emery Indus., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 51 (1964).
75 E.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (Aug. 25, 1978);
East Ohio Gas Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1963); Harris-Woodson Co., 85 N.L.R.B.
1215 (1949), enforced, 179 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1950).
7 8E.g., Fluhrer Bakeries, 232 N.L.R.B. 212 (1977); Ocean Sys., Inc., 223
N.L.R.B. 857 (1976), enforced, 571 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
77 E.g., Sun Oil Co. v. NLBB, 576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Pearl
Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108 (1st Cir. 1975); Fluhrer Bakeries, 232 N.L.R.B.
212 (1977).
78 E.g., J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); American Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLBB,
457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972).
79 E.g., United States Gypsum Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 931 (1967); Emery Indus.,
Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 51 (1964).
S0 E.g., NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); Good
Hope Indus., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Dec. 6, 1978).
81 E.g., NLRB v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108 (1st Cir. 1975); New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (Aug. 25, 1978); F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1972).
s2 E.g., Missouri Serv. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1142 (1949).
8 3 See NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., 179 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1950).
84 In Harris-Woodson Co., Judge Parker observed:
Metaphysical arguments as to the nature of the entity with which we are
dealing should not be permitted to obscure the substance of what has
been done or to furnish a smoke screen behind which the company may
with impunity defy the requirements of the statute that it bargain with
the representative that its employees have chosen.
Id. 723.
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the courts drew uncritically on the common law of contracts and of
unincorporated associations to resolve emerging problems in the
application of the Wagner Act. 8 State courts had confronted the
problem of union successorship primarily in disaffiliation cases in
which the disposition of the predecessor union's assets was in dis-
pute s1 or in suits growing out of labor agreements between the
employer and the union.8 7 Not infrequently, the courts were called
upon to determine whether the successor union was the same legal
entity as the predecessor, and accordingly various criteria of identity
were relied upon to decide the question. One principle that
emerged was that a mere change in name or affiliation does not alter
a union's legal identity."" The clear implication was that a change
in name and affiliation accompanied by changes in the union's con-
stitution, membership, or leadership can indeed add up to a change
of legal identity.
This common law mode of analysis was absorbed, for the most
part, into federal law. In M & M Wood Working Co.,s9 for ex-
ample, the Board faced an employer's contention that its contract-
with the union terminated when the union withdrew from the
American Federation of Labor, affiliated with the Committee for
Industrial Organization, and altered its name to reflect the change.
Although the Board managed to sidestep the issue, it foreshadowed
the course of its decisions by quoting approvingly and extensively
from a New York case espousing the maxim that changes in name
and affiliation do not in themselves signify a change of legal iden-
tity.90 Shortly thereafter, in American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.,91
the Board adopted the very same rule as its own, observing that
the successor local
85 Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976)).
86 C. Summers, supra note 71, at 262. E.g., Kelso v. Cavanagh, 137 Misc.
653, 656-57, 244 N.Y.S. 90, 94 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Shipwrights Local 2 v. Mitchell,
60 Wash. 529, 111 P. 780 (1910).
87 Cassetana v. Filling Station Operators Local 410, 1A L.R.R.M. 672 (Cal.
Super. 1937); Klinger v. J.S. Krum, Inc., 259 App. Div. 309, 19 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1940); World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, 166 Misc. 854, 2 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup.
Ct. 1938); cf. Labonite v. Cannery Workers' Local 18257, 197 Wash. 543, 86
P.2d 189 (1938) (contracts between a union and a number of laborers).
88 World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, 166 Misc. 854, 2 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Labonite v. Cannery Workers' Local 18257, 197 Wash. 543, 86 P.2d 189
(1938); E. O.xEs, Tnn LAw or ORGANZED LABOR AND INDUSTRAL CONMFLCT
90 (1927).
89 6 N.L.R.B. 372 (1938), enforcement denied, 101 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1939).
90 World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, 166 Misc. 854, 2 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
91 10 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1939).
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has the same members, membership records, officers, and
funds, and performs the same functions as did the Union
under its former name ..... It is plain that nothing more
than a change in name and affiliation took place, and we
find that the labor organization certified by us did not
cease to exist because of its transfer of affiliation.92
There is much to recommend the simple rule that a mere
change in name or affiliation does not alter a union's legal identity.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how collective bargaining could
survive without it: if employers were free to repudiate labor agree-
ments whenever the contracting union changed its name or shifted
its allegiance, labor strife of nightmarish dimensions could well be
the result. However, the corollary to this simple rule-that changes
in name or affiliation, when accompanied by changes in other indicia
of legal identity, can alter the union's legal identity and thereby
dissolve the employer's duty to honor the collective bargaining
agreement-is not so obviously beneficial. Its incorporation in the
continuity of representation doctrine must therefore be subjected
to searching scrutiny.
As a general rule, doctrines derived from the common law of
yesteryear are ill-suited for coping with the complexities of con-
temporary labor union structure. Displacing such outmoded and
inadequate rules was one of Congress's major aims in creating the
regulatory scheme of the National Labor Relations Act.93 With its
origins in the common law of contracts and of unincorporated asso-
ciations, the metaphysical approach to continuity of representation
is not likely to foster the policies of the Act. Indeed, to deny effect
to an affiliation freely chosen by a majority of the union member-
ship merely because of a change in the dues structure or in the
union's constitution is to transgress two fundamental principles of
92 Id. 1362.
9 3 See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 332 U.S. 111 (1944). For criticism
of the unthinking application of contract law to collective bargaining agreements,
see, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957);
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAIv. L. RBv. 999
(1955); C. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE
L.J. 525 (1969). The rule that the substantive law governing collective bargaining
agreements must be fashioned from the policy of the national labor laws, Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. at 456, has been applied to a successor employer's bargaining duties.
E.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Rest. Employees
Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1974). See Morris & Gaus, Successorship and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. REv.
1359 (1973). To the extent that "freedom of contract" principles survive under
the NLRA, they do so as an express legislative policy. NLRB v. Burns Int'l
Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281-87 (1972); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397
U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
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labor law. First, because such a result frees the employer from its
obligation to observe the contract, the immediate result is to destroy
an established collective bargaining relationship. Second, a legal
rule that requires courts to examine and pass judgment on fluctua-
tions in the union's internal structure violates "the basic premise of
judicial restraint in interfering with union self-government." 94
When no schism occurs and the successor union pledges to
honor the contract already in place, continuity of representation is
established in the only sense meaningful to the national labor policy.
No other factors should be considered. Additional measures of con-
tinuity, inherited from common law sources and pressed into the
service of an unnecessarily strict statutory interpretation, work
merely to destabilize collective bargaining relationships and to in-
vite unwarranted intrusion into internal union affairs.
It may be, however, that some of the additional criteria
habitually employed to assess continuity of representation are mean-
ingful, not in themselves, but for the purpose of determining
whether or not a schism has occurred. The carry-over of officers
from an independent to an affiliated local, for example, is probative
of the fact that the independent is defunct and does not oppose the
affiliation.05 Perhaps, too, the requirement that the local preserve
its autonomy is predicated on an assumption that autonomy is the
natural desire of all labor organizations, and its voluntary abdication
a cause for suspicion.
This approach to the continuity doctrine explains the Board's
decision in Quemetco, Inc.9 6 in which a divided panel overruled the
administrative law judge and upheld an affiliation despite a com-
plete lack of what is usually called "continuity of representation." 97
In that case, the vote to affiliate was unanimous, and the record in-
dicated that the officers of the independent "simply wanted to get
out of the union business." 98 Thus, the facts clearly belied any
tacit assumption of a desire for autonomy. No officers of the inde-
pendent were retained, and the independent did not survive as an
autonomous unit after the affiliation. Denying that the carry-over
of officers is of supreme importance in an affiliation case, the Board
announced that it was
94 C. Summers, supra note 71, at 262.
9' See Bedford Gear & Mach. Prods., Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 1 (1964); Note,
The Legal Consequences of Labor Union Schisms, 63 HAsv. L. REv. 1413, 1422
(1950).
"226 N.L.R.B. 1398 (1976).
97Accord, Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 419 (1963).
98Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1399 (1976).
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much more concerned with giving effect to the employees'
free choice of bargaining representative than with the so-
called "continuity of representation" which might be dis-
rupted by such election. For it is the employees' freedom
to select a bargaining representative of their choice which
is of paramount importance under the Act.99
Noting that no employee objected to the discontinuity of union
leadership, the Board overruled the employer's objections, stating
that the employer's legitimate interest in continuity was limited
strictly to the honoring of contractual commitments. 100
Quemetco makes good sense. It strikes an appropriate balance
between the Act's policies of guaranteeing the freedom of employ-
ees to choose (or repudiate) their representatives and of providing
for "some measure of repose" and stability in collective bargain-
ing.1°1 When established collective bargaining relationships are
not in jeopardy, every reason exists for giving effect to the em-
ployees' freedom of choice. Unfortunately, Quemetco is the
exception, rather than the rule. Both the Board 0 2 and the courts '0
have tended to insist on additional evidence of continuity of repre-
sentation without seriously considering whether that evidence has
any bearing, positive or negative, on the stability of collective bar-
gaining relationships.
C. The Third Circuit View and the Triumph of Metaphysics
American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB 10
is perhaps the leading case on this subject. In American Bridge, an
independent association with some 300 members, pursuant to a
99 Id.
100 Prior to affiliation with the Teamsters, the employees in the bargaining unit
had been represented by the Chemical Workers. The employees petitioned for a
decertification election and asked the Teamsters to intervene. Id. See note 65
supra. The Teamsters refused because of a no-raiding pact with the Chemical
Workers. The independent was successful in the decertification election and sought
out the Teamsters within a few months, this time successfully. 226 N.L.R.B. 1398,
1399 (1976).
lo R. GoRm v, supra note 61, at 52. See generally Cushman, The Duration
of Certifications by the National Labor Relations Board and the Doctrine of
Administrative Stability, 45 MicH. L. BEiv. 1 (1946).
102 See, e.g., Independent Drug Store Owners, 211 N.L.R.B. 701 (1974),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Retail Store Employees Local 428 v. NLRB, 528 F.2d
1225 (9th Cir. 1975); Gas Serv. Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 932 (1974); Gulf Oil Corp., 135
N.L.R.B. 184 (1962).
103 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bernard Gloekier N.E. Co., 540 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1976); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. NLRB, 244 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1957).
104 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972).
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unanimous resolution by its executive committee, voted, 111 to
eighty-five, to affiliate with the United Steelworkers of America,
whose membership numbered 1,120,000. The association was sub-
sequently chartered as a local of the Steelworkers, and the officers
of the association became officers of the local. Bank and checking
accounts were also transferred to the affiliated organization.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, overturning the
Board's finding of continuity of representation, 1 5 concluded that the
affiliated local was "a far different organization because the people
who conduct a substantial part of the unit's dealings with manage-
ment are no longer the association's officers, and the power of the
unit's members to control those agents has radically changed." 106
As evidence for this proposition, the court relied solely on the
Steelworkers' International Constitution, which required strikes to
be approved by the international president, vested control of the
grievance procedure in the international as well as the local, made
the international the contracting party in collective bargaining, and
provided that dues deductions be remitted to the international secre-
tary-treasurer. 10 7 Observing a "change in the fulcrum of union
control and representation," 108 the court questioned whether the
interests of the officers of the giant International and the interests
of the 300-odd employees of the association would necessarily co-
incide. 109
Because the court went on to find that the affiliation election
was procedurally deficient 110 and because it strongly endorsed the
safeguards of a Board-conducted election when substantial changes
in the rights and duties of employees create a potential for "serious
105 In denying enforcement, the court overturned a finding of fact Such Board
findings must be sustained if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole. J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 893 (1978); Retail Store Employees Local 428 v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 1225
(9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); NLBB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35
(8th Cir. 1974).
106 457 F.2d at 663.
107 Id. 664 & n.3.
108 Id. 664.
109 The court's exclusive reliance on the change in the bargaining representative
brought about by the International's constitution, if pursued to its logical end, would
terminate the collective bargaining relationships of an international's locals whenever
significant changes were made in the international's constitution.
110 After notice of the affiliation-vote meeting had been mailed, a former officer
of the independent presented a petition signed by more than 100 members requesting
a special meeting for the purpose of discussing the affiliation issue. Although the
petition met the requirements of the local's constitution for calling special meetings,
the request was denied. 457 F.2d at 662. The court also found fault with the
secrecy of the ballot. Id. 666.
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discontent" or "labor unrest," :" American Bridge might well have
been interpreted as turning primarily on the procedural issues, rather
than on the question whether continuity of representation had been
preserved. Such tension between the due process and continuity
branches of the union successorship doctrine has already been no-
ticed in the opinions in the Amoco case."12  Subsequent decisions
by the same court of appeals preclude this interpretation, however.
In Sun Oil Co. v. NLRB," 3 no question of election procedure
arose, but the court flatly held that
when a local independent labor union affiliates with and
becomes a local unit of an international union and trans-
fers control over the rights of its members to the interna-
tional whose constitution and by-laws make substantial
changes in the rights of employees to the contract, affects
their obligations to management and links their concerns
with thousands of other members of the international
throughout the country, a change is effected in the bargain-
ing agent .... 1 1
4
Because a new bargaining representative was created by such an
affiliation, the court found that the existing collective bargaining
agreement was terminated and that the employer had no duty to
comply with its terms. Further, the employer was not obligated to
recognize or bargain with the affiliated local until the latter was
certified by the Board as the result of a Board-conducted election. 115
Sun Oil stands the continuity doctrine on its head. No realistic
observer of labor relations would differ with the judgment that an
important change took place in the bargaining representative of
Sun Oil's employees. By focusing solely on this change, the court
failed to understand the function of the continuity doctrine in pre-
serving industrial stability. The effect of the court's decision in
Sun Oil is that any affiliation by an independent with an interna-
tional destroys the independent's certification, terminates the con-
tract, and frees the employer of its duty to bargain.116 A result more
destructive of industrial stability can hardly be imagined.
"' Id. 664.
112 See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
13 576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1978).
"4 Id. 558.
"15 Id.
116 Although the opinion in Sun Oil spoke of "specific factors" indicating the
substitution of a new bargaining representative, it is hard to imagine an affiliation
that the court's expansive holding would fail to embrace. Every international worth
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As there was no doubt that the employees freely chose to affili-
ate, the Sun Oil court could not base its decision on the policy of
employee free choice. Nor did it appeal to the policy of preserving
industrial stability, at least in the sense of honoring contractual
commitments. The court's opinion did suggest, however, that an-
other aspect of stability-preserving the balance of power between
union and employer-figured in its decision. Citing its earlier
opinion in NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler North East Co.,117 in which
it had attached "particular significance" to a substantial increase in
the union's economic power, the court lamented that Sun Oil was
being ordered to bargain with an international union of 200,000
members that could "flex considerably more bargaining muscle"
than could the unaffiliated local with its paltry membership of
thirty.118
In Gloekler, the court's concern for the erosion of the em-
ployer's bargaining strength relative to the union's was even more
marked. Noting the increased economic resources of the union as
a result of affiliation, the court expressed concern that strike bene-
fits paid by the international would make the employees more
-autonomous in the event of a work stoppage and fretted that the
power of the international "could be used aggressively to affect
Company contracting-out decisions." 119
The view that the preservation of industrial stability includes
protection of the employer from increases in the union's bargaining
clout has been expressly repudiated by the Board on a number of
occasions 120 and has no basis in the Act. According to the Board,
the employer's interest in continuity of representation extends no
farther than the successor union's commitment to honor existing
contractual obligations.121 Even assuming that the employer has a
cognizable interest in preventing shifts in the balance of power in
the union's favor, certainly the employer's private interest is not so
great as to outweigh the combined public interest in giving effect
to employees' desires and in preserving the stable bargaining rela-
tionships based on existing collective agreements.
affiliating with is likely to have a constitution giving the international a degree of
control over its locals. And it is only by virtue of the 'linked concerns" of the
international's thousands of members that it possesses the economic resources that
an independent seeks.
117540 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1976).
118 576 F.2d at 557.
"9 540 F.2d at 202.
120New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (1978); Newspapers,
Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 8 (1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1975).
121 Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398 (1976).
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The preceding review of the continuity of representation doc-
trine attempted to show that the doctrine's proper function should
be to trigger Board disapproval of affiliations or mergers that jeopar-
dize the stability of collective bargaining relationships. If no schism
is involved and if the successor union pledges to honor the existing
contract, the employer should be required to recognize and bargain
with the successor and to honor its contractual obligations, provided
that the affiliation represents the majority will. This requirement
should hold whether or not the identity of the bargaining repre-
sentative is substantially changed by the transaction.
From this vantage point, Member Penello's dissent in Amoco 122
requires little further discussion. His assertion that the local's
duty to follow the international's constitution brought about a
change in the rights and obligations of the employees and sub-
stantially altered the bargaining representative's identity123 is im-
material to the issue of continuity of representation, as defined
here. No real question of the affiliated local's majority status was
raised. Member Penello did not assert that the independent was
still in existence or opposed to the affiliation, or that the election
procedures were inadequate. The successor local sought to honor
the existing collective bargaining agreement, not to avoid it. In-
deed, the nub of the dispute was the attempt by the union to
enforce the contract in the face of the employer's repudiation. The
Board's order to the employer to recognize the affiliated local and
honor its contract thus served the twin goals of giving effect to the
employees' free choice of bargaining representative and promoting
industrial stability. In contrast, Member Penello's dissent, if fol-
lowed, would frustrate both these ends, while serving only the
employer's private interest in maintaining its bargaining advantage
over a small and relatively powerless unaffiliated local.
III. DuE PRocEss AND THE INELIGIBILITY OF NONMEMBERS
Once the irrelevant aspects of the continuity doctrine of con-
tinuity of representation have been discarded, the affiliation in
Amoco cannot be questioned on that score. Remaining, however,
is the question whether the decision to affiliate accorded with due
process, the second prong in the analysis of affiliations. 24
122 See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
123Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 11-12 (Jan. 3, 1979)
(Penello, M., dissenting), appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
124 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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The revised interpretation of continuity of representation ad-
vanced in part II yields a rationale for this second prong that the
Board's view is incapable of providing. Under the Board's official
doctrine, which holds that affiliation is merely an internal union
matter and denies that material changes are taking place in the
identity of the bargaining representative, there is no intelligible
reason why the Board should review affiliation elections for due
process. 1' Such review, moreover, contravenes the Board's general
policy of not intruding on internal union affairs.' 26 This anomaly
vanishes once it is acknowledged that affiliation often does result
in a significant alteration of the bargaining representative. Given
the strong national policy favoring democratically chosen bargain-
ing representatives, the Board would be remiss if it left affiliation
procedures entirely up to the unions.
The new approach to continuity offered here also explains
why the standards of due process required in union-run affiliation
elections need not be as stringent as the Board's standards for the
decertification elections it conducts pursuant to section 9 (c)(1) of
the Act 27 when a question concerning representation has been
raised. Strict procedures are necessary in these Board-conducted
elections because the majority status of the bargaining representa-
tive has been challenged. By contrast, in a union affiliation that
preserves continuity of representation, no evidence of the union's
loss of majority support has been presented and no question con-
cerning representation exists. Thus, the standard of review ought
to be whether the procedural irregularities are so great that they
raise a suspicion of foul play and thereby trigger a question con-
cerning representation. If it appears that the election accurately
reflects the desires of a majority of the union membership, the
exact procedures followed are immaterial. This flexible standard
has in fact been embraced by the Board 128 and largely approved by
125 See text accompanying note 59 supra.
32 6 See Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 574 n.8 (1971).
12729 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976). Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182,
slip op. at 4 (Jan. 3, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1979);
Goodfriend W. Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 527 (1977); Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B.
1398 (1976); North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942 (1967). But see American
Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972).
328 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 575 (1971).
Considerations of administrative economy would justify the Board in dispensing
with due process review altogether for changes in union structure at the international
and federation level; such changes are too indirectly related to representational issues
to merit the Board's attention.
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the courts.12 9
A flexible standard for review of affiliation-election procedures
is necessary if the Board's practice of honoring union-conducted elec-
tions is to have any meaning. Union leaders, especially at the local
level, naturally take an unsophisticated view of what constitutes
proper procedure and so should not be held to standards of legal
precision. Adoption of rigid procedural requirements would thus
undermine the utility of the Board's approach by increasing the
number of elections disapproved. By encouraging employers to
litigate, rigid procedural rules would also tax the Board's resources
and frustrate that administrative economy which is one of the major
advantages of the Board's practice of giving effect to privately con-
ducted elections rather than conducting its own.
A. The Indicia of Due Process
The Board and the courts evaluate affiliation decisionmaking
procedures in light of two general requisites of due process: the
accurate recording of employee desires and the opportunity to make
an informed and reasoned decision. The primary and most fre-
quently considered criteria are adequacy of notice, opportunity for
discussion, secrecy of the ballots, and integrity of the balloting and
tabulating process. On occasion, other issues, such as compliance
with the union constitution and bylaws and timeliness of the elec-
tion, are also addressed.
One of the hallmarks of due process is adequate notice. All
employees eligible to participate in the affiliation decision must be
notified that affiliation is being considered. The notice requirement
guards against the possibility of action by a minority of union
members without the prior knowledge of their fellows. Notice pro-
cedures approved by the Board in affiliation cases have varied. In
some, the union posted notices prominently, distributed more by
hand, and even mailed them to all members.130 In others, signs
were posted only on the plant bulletin board.131 A notice left on
each employee's desk has also been found to be sufficient. 3 2 The
329J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850, 856-57 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); NLRB v. Newspapers, Inc., 515 F.2d 334, 339 (5th
Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 42 (8th Cir. 1974).
130 See, e.g., J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971);
Equipment Mfg. Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 419 (1969).
131 See, e.g., East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 577 (1971); North
Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942 (1967).
132 McKesson Wine & Spirits Co., Div. of Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 232
N.L.R.B. 210 (1977).
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means by which employees are notified are not crucial, as long as
they are adequate to assure a general awareness that the issue will
be debated or decided at a given time and place.
Opportunity for discussion is also demanded by the Board and
the courts.133 The opportunity need not be extensive: a few
minutes of discussion just prior to a vote is enough.134 When a
substantial number of union members seek a formal discussion of
the affiliation issue in accordance with established procedures, how-
ever, the union leadership's refusal to provide a forum may be a
denial of due process.135
Provisions for the secrecy of the ballot need not be as stringent
as in Board-conducted elections; 136 precautions designed to ensure
a reasonable expectation of privacy usually suffice.137 Indeed, non-
secret votes have been sustained in two cases involving mergers be-
tween locals of the same international,138 which suggests that the
Board's secrecy standards may vary with the nature of the case. 39
Although a membership list at the polling place for the purpose
of checking voter eligibility is not essential,140 an election conducted
without adequate safeguards against double balloting will be dis-
approved. 141 Ambiguously labeled ballots,142 consumption of beer
during the voting process, 43 and informal polling in place of a
formal election ' 44 are all factors that have been relied upon to in-
validate an election. The Board has consistently held that the
presence of an impartial observer at the election is unnecessary . 45
Employers often raise objections to the union's failure to
comply with its own constitution or bylaws, but the Board, in keep-
ing with its policy of not intruding into the union's self-government,
will not overturn an affiliation election on these grounds absent "a
133 See, e.g., American Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660
(3d Cir. 1972); Peco, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 1036 (1973).
'34 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 574 (1971).
"35 Peco, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 1036 (1973).
136 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 575 (1971).
137 Good Hope Indus., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Dec. 6, 1978); New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (Aug. 25, 1978).
138Samuel P. Katz, 231 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1977); Kentucky Power Co., 213
N.L.R.B. 730 (1974).
139 See text accompanying notes 150-53 infra.
140 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 575 (1971).
11 J.H. Day Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 863 (1973).
142 Id.
143Id.
144Fall River House, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1972).
1451 Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 574-75 (1971). See Samuel P. Katz,
231 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1977); Equipment Mfg. Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 419 (1969).
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clear. showing . . . of substantial irregularity." 146 On occasion,
the courts have been less cautious.
147
More often than not, the Board has given its endorsement to
elections conducted after the affiliation or merger has taken place.
148
In a number of older cases involving realignments within the same
international union, the requirement of an election apparently was
dispensed with altogether. 149
This brief overview of the criteria of due process employed in
reviewing union-affiliation elections suggests that a double standard
exists. Specifically, a less stringent standard is applied to mergers
between locals of the same international union. 5 0 One commenta-
tor has generalized this observation: "Seemingly in evaluating the
adequacy of the approval vote . . . , the Board has placed the facts
of the case on a mythical spectrum reflecting the degree of change
in the certified representative." 1-1 Whether or not that characteri-
zation of the Board's practice can account for all of the case law,' 52
it appears to be largely correct.
Despite the prevailing mythology that affiliations and mergers
preserving continuity of representation do not result in a change in
the bargaining representative's identity, in fact they do. Cognizant
of the absurdity of the fiction and wary lest the perceived require-
ments of the Act be evaded, the Board and the courts have attempted
to allay their discomfiture through stricter review of union decision-
making procedures. The greater the change in the bargaining
representative, the greater the resemblance to a question concerning
representation which the Act requires to be resolved by an election
146 Gate City Optical Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 1059, 1060 n.3 (1969).
147 See American Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLBB, 457 F.2d 660, 665-66
(3d Cir. 1972).
148 See, e.g., Flulirer Bakeries, 232 N.L.R.B. 212 (1977); American Enka Co.,
Div. of Akzona, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1977); Ocean Sys., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 857
(1976), enforced, 571 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978); Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 311 (1968). But see Carriage Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B.
620 (1974).
149 See cases cited in note 59 supra.
150 See, e.g., Samuel P. Katz, 231 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1977); Kentucky Power Co.,
213 N.L.R.B. 730 (1974); Montgomery Ward & Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 551 (1971);
Climax Molybdenum Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 508 (1964). But see Underwriters Ad-
justing Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 453 (1976).
151 Note, Union Mergers and the Amendment Certification Procedure, 28 CATE.
U. L. REv. 587, 598 (1979).
152 See, e.g., Carriage Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 620 (1974)
(despite approval by 90% of unit employees, intra-union shift denied recognition
for lack of due process). Compare Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398 (1976)
with Independent Drug Store Owners, 211 N.L.R.B. 701 (1974), aff'd per curiam
sub nom. Retail Store Employees Local 428 v. NLRB, 528 F. 2d 1225 (9th Cir.
1975).
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conducted by the Board. Hence the tendency to require election
conduct that more closely approximates the stringent standards ap-
plicable in representation and decertification elections.
Under the analysis of continuity of representation presented in
part II, this sliding-scale approach must be rejected. The Board's
understanding of its statutory authority to endorse union affiliations
is unnecessarily narrow; section 9(c)(1) does not prevent the Board
from giving effect to affiliations in cases in which the identity of the
bargaining representative changes, and such changes are irrelevant
to the question whether continuity has been preserved.u 3  If no
schism occurs and the successor union pledges to honor the existing
collective bargaining agreement, no question concerning representa-
tion arises. Once continuity is established in accordance with these
criteria, no reason exists for resurrecting the ghost of identity to
haunt due process review. A single flexible standard of due process
is possible, one to be applied to all affiliations and mergers that
preserve continuity of representation: whether the outcome of the
election accurately reflects the membership's true desires.
By the criteria analyzed in this section, the procedures followed
by the local in Amoco were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
due process.'6 4 Extensive notice was given and multiple oppor-
tunities for discussion were afforded. 15 5 The strictures of the local's
constitution were followed. 5 6 The election procedures-while pos-
sibly not perfect-appear to have been sufficient to assure reasonable
accuracy. 157 Finally, the balloting, done by mail, was secret and
without serious irregularity. 158 There is therefore no basis for con-
cluding that the employees' choice was not freely made and accu-
rately determined.
One question remains, however: that of voter eligibility.
B. Eligibility of Nonmembers
The Amoco case poses the difficult question whether voter
eligibility for union nonmembers ought to be mandatory in affilia-
tion elections. Three distinct arguments can be advanced in favor
153 See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra. But see note 128 supra.
154 See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
155 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 4 (Jan. 3, 1979),
appeal docketed, 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
156 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
157 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 5 (Jan. 3, 1979),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1979). But see note 29 supra.
158 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 4-5 (Jan. 3, 1979),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
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oEi requiring eligibility: (1) that nonmembers have a statutory right
to participate in the affiliation election; (2) that excluding non-
members may affect the outcome of the election and thus create
doubt about the successor union's majority; and (3) that non-
members have an important stake in the outcome.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the weight of
precedent supports the Amoco decision not to require eligibility.
Until the 3-2 decision in Jasper Seating Co.,159 the Board's policy
was to affirm affiliation elections from which nonmembers had been
excluded.160 The only precedent that the Jasper Seating majority
was able to cite was a dissenting opinion in a case decided ten years
before.' (6' The Board's reversal of Jasper Seating in Amoco thus
marks a return to its well-settled doctrines.
The only appellate court to consider the question appears to
agree in substance with this line of cases. In NLRB v. Commercial
Letter, Inc., 62 two international unions merged to form a new
international. Subsequently, two locals of the new international
merged to form a new local. The employer's workers voted on
neither merger because they were not yet members of the union.
Looking to the Board's prior cases, the court concluded that "a mere
prospective interest in union affairs does not mean that an employee
who is not a union member need be given the chance to vote on
internal union restructuring, absent a showing, at least, that the
votes of those employees could have changed the result of the elec-
tion." 168 The court cited approvingly a decision by another court
of appeals upholding an amendment of certification in a merger
case even though there was no evidence that the merger had been
approved by a vote of the members. 64
The view that nonmembers have a statutory right to vote in
affiliation elections is apparently inspired by the similarity of the
results that flow from an affiliation election and a Board-conducted
decertification election in which all bargaining unit employees can
159231 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977).
16OBear Archery, Div. of Victor Comptometer Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1169
(1976), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1977); Amoco Prod. Co.,
220 N.L.R.B. 861 (1975); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971); East
Dayton Tool & Die Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 577 (1971); Equipment Mfg. Co., 174
N.L.R.B. 419 (1969); North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942 (1967); United States
Gypsum Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 931 (1967); East Ohio Gas Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1269
(1963).
161 North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 943 (1967) (Jenkins & Zagoria, MM.,
dissenting).
162496 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974).
6 Id. 40.
164 Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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participate. 65 Simply put, the idea is that if nonmembers have a
right to vote in one type of election, they must be allowed to vote
in the other. It does not follow from the similarity in result, how-
ever, that the Act requires the relevant electorate in affiliation
elections and decertification elections to be the same. Although in
both types of elections the fate of an existing bargaining representa-
tive hangs in the balance, important differences exist.
A petition to decertify can be filed by thirty percent of the
employees in the bargaining unit, or by a union in their behalf,
and must allege that the bargaining representative lacks the support
of a majority of the bargaining unit employees.16 If the employer
files a petition, it must produce objective evidence to support its
belief that the union no longer enjoys majority status. 67 The
bargaining representative may, and usually will, oppose the petition,
and other unions may intervene to seek a place on the ballot.168
In a decertification election, the incumbent representative's majority
status is on trial. The outcome may be to de-unionize altogether
(a vote for no union) or to decertify the existing representative
and simultaneously to certify an entirely new, and opposing, union.
By contrast, in the affiliation situation, the union's majority
status is not in question. The procedure cannot be instigated by
the employer 169 or any union other than the incumbent. 170 The
only question to be decided is whether the membership desires to
affiliate; if the affiliation is defeated, the status quo remains un-
changed.
In the decertification context, when the incumbent union's
majority status has affirmatively been cast into doubt and a question
concerning representation has been raised, the Act requires that
all employees in the bargaining unit be eligible to vote, whether
or not they are members of the incumbent union. To exclude non-
members would defeat the very purpose of the election: determin-
ing which union, if any, represents the majority of the employees.
Accordingly, when the issue of the successor union's majority has
165 See, e.g., Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 576 (1971) (Miller, Ch.,
concurring).
16629 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1976). See note 67 supra & accompanying
text.
167 United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (1966). See note
67 supra.
168 See, e.g., San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers v. NLBB,
501 F.2d 794, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1974); National Carbon Div., Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 460 (1950).
169 See Cocker Saw Co. v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1971).
370 News-Press Publishing Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 803 (1964).
[Vol. 128:430
UNION AFFILIATIONS
been injected into an affiliation situation by the predecessor union's
opposition, creating a schism, the Board has consistently declined
to validate the affiliation and declared instead that a representation
question has been raised.171
But a different rule is appropriate when the affiliation repre-
sents the uncontroverted desire of the union organization-as cor-
roborated by the majority of its voting membership-and no thirty-
percent showing of interest nor any objective evidence raising a
positive doubt of the union's majority support exists. In such a
case, no question concerning representation arises and the dictates
of the Act do not apply. That no real issue of majority rule is
present is confirmed by the fact that in the typical contested affilia-
tion, the employer alone opposes the affiliation and is unable to
muster even one employee with objections to the change.
The exclusion of nonmembers from affiliation elections does
not in any way diminish their rights under the Act. The decertifi-
cation route remains available, guaranteeing to all employees-
members and nonmembers alike-the right to repudiate their bar-
gaining representative. If the Board's ratification of an affiliation
leaves the unit with a bargaining representative that lacks majority
support, the possibility of decertification ensures that the error may
be easily remedied. 72
A second argument for requiring voter eligibility of nonmem-
bers in affiliation elections is that the exclusion of a number of
nonmembers large enough to have affected the outcome of the elec-
tion places in doubt the successor union's majority status. In other
contexts, however, the Board has required, in the interest of stability,
a showing of much more than a mere possibility before finding that
a union's majority status has been successfully questioned. Thus,
employers relying on a heavy turnover of personnel to raise a doubt
about the incumbent union's continuing majority have not met
with success; the Board assumes that the new employees support
the union in the same proportion as the employees they replace.
173
Even a showing that fewer than half of the employees are union
members will not suffice to create a doubt of the union's majority 74
'7 1 See notes 70 & 71 supra.
3-72Because the Board has ruled that a valid affiliation does not result in a new
certification, no certification-year bar arises to shield the successor union from at-
tempts by the employees or by the employer to win decertification. See note 61
supra.
173 Harpeth Steel, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 545 (1974); R. Goimw, supra note
61, at 111.
174Bartenders Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974); B. Gom".A, supra note 61,
at 11i.
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because nonmembers may support the union but not wish to pay
the costs of membership.
This reluctance to doubt the union's majority status absent
convincing evidence is equally appropriate in the affiliation con-
text. It cannot be assumed that every nonmember excluded from
the election would vote if given the opportunity, nor can it be
assumed that if allowed to vote, every nonmember would cast his
vote against the affiliation. Disenchanted employees who have
refused membership in the predecessor local may welcome a change
in affiliation. Finally, the desires of union members ought not be
frustrated because of the possibility that some nonmembers who
may object to the affiliation have chosen not to incur the expense
associated with a voice in union affairs.
The third argument for allowing nonmember participation
in affiliation votes carries little weight. Although nonmembers cer-
tainly have a stake in the outcome of the affiliation, the same is true
of many other union decisions. Nonmembers have no right to
vote on decisions to ratify contracts, to strike, to elect union officers,
to raise dues, or to adopt a new constitution.175 If a nonmember's
stake in affiliation is great enough to require his vote, it is fair to
assume that he will take the plunge and join the union.
Practical considerations also warrant treating the union mem-
bership as the relevant electorate in affiliation decisions. Although
internal union organization sometimes corresponds exactly to the
Board's designations of bargaining units, as in Amoco, it is not un-
common for the primary organizational unit of the union to encom-
pass several bargaining units. If a majority in each unit were
mandatory, then the affiliation of a multi-unit independent could
well throw into doubt its bargaining status with respect to each
unit because a vote by the employees as a whole would not neces-
sarily reflect the desires of the employees in any individual bargain-
ing unit. 76 The result could be substantial confusion and insta-
175 Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 3 (Jan. 3, 1979),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
176 For example, if an independent local representing 100 employees in ten
units of ten employees each voted 94-6 in favor of affiliation, every one of the
ten employers could refuse to recognize the affiliated local by questioning whether
a majority of the employees in its bargaining unit had voted to affiliate.
In William B. Tanner Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 566 (1974), enforcement denied,
517 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1975), the Board, over the dissenter's objections, declined
to accept the employer's bargaining unit as the group within which a majority was
required and looked instead to the overall vote in the multi-unit local. The court
of appeals appeared to agree with the dissent. See also NLRB v. Canton Sign Co.,
457 F.2d 832, 842 (6th Cir. 1972) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority
opinion's use of bargaining unit electorate); Montgomery Ward & Co., 188 N.L.R.B.
551 (1971); United States Gypsum Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 931 (1967).
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bility, in the independent's collective bargaining relationships.
This problem could be avoided if the Board required that
affiliation votes be conducted on a unit-by-unit basis. But the
Board has never set itself up as an arbiter of internal union struc-
ture, and to do so here would clearly paralyze a union's ability to act
as a unified entity.177 A union contemplating affiliation would have
to reckon with the risk of losing several of its bargaining units in
the process. The risk would be huge if the rule were extended to
mergers consummated at the international level and could well
result in disruption of collective bargaining relationships through-
out the nation. The Board ought not set up unnecessary obstacles
to the constant and inevitable shifts in intra-union and inter-union
relationships.
177 Although the Board does not require a showing that any of the employees
in a bargaining unit actually voted, the result may be different when the entire
unit is ineligible to vote in the union election. In amendment of certification cases
in which none of the employees in the employer's bargaining unit were allowed
to vote on the affiliation or merger, the Board withheld its endorsement. Factory
Serv., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 722 (1971); Rinker Materials Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 1688
(1967); M.A. Norden Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 1730 (1966); Yale Mfg. Co., 157 N.L.R.B.
597 (1966). When, however, the nonmember status of the entire unit has been
attributable to the employer's illegal refusal to bargain, the employer has not been
permitted to profit from its unlawful refusal and the affiliation or merger has been
upheld. NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 41 n.2 (8th Cir. 1974);
Goodfriend W. Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 527, 528 (1977). In the latter cases the
employees' ineligibility for union membership resulted from a common union policy
of not accepting membership applications until a collective bargaining agreement
with the employer has been signed.
The amendment of certification cases need not be construed as an exception
to the Board's rule against requiring unions to permit nonmembers to vote on affilia-
tions or mergers. In each case the petition to amend certification was dismissed
without prejudice, with the clear understanding that a post-hoc ratification vote
by those unit employees who later became union members would satisfy the Board's
due process requirements. Thus the rule in these cases is not that unions must
allow nonmembers to vote, but rather that NLRB recognition of the affiliation or
merger must await the nonmembers' ability to join the union.
Given that the illegal refusal to bargain in both Commercial Letter and
Goodfriend predated the union mergers, it is interesting to speculate what ap-
proach would be adopted if the employer's refusal to bargain were predicated
upon the invalidity of the merger. In such a case, the employer would not be
responsible for the original ineligibility of its employees, but it would be responsible
for their continuing ineligibility. Were the Board to decline recognition of a
merger in these circumstances, it would, in effect, be requiring the union to permit
nonmembers to vote. On the other hand, the employer's refusal would be justified
by analogy to the amendment of certification cases and the Board's doctrine that
the same substantive law applies to anendment of certification and refusal to
bargain cases. See cases cited in note 16 supra.
The optimal solution would be to require the employer to bargain and to
demand that the union demonstrate the employees' consent in a merger-ratification
vote after the contract is signed. The election would be reviewed by the Board
through the amendment of certification procedure. Such an approach would mini-
mize the disruptive effects of mergers and affiliations on collective bargaining, while
respecting the union's interest in conducting its own affairs .free from outside inter-
ference and protecting the unit employees' interest in not submitting to a change
in representative without an opportunity to express their consent.
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In addition to these reasons for respecting the integrity of the
union's internal structure, requiring that nonmembers be allowed
to participate in affiliation and merger elections would adversely
affect the union's capacity for self-government. Because the Board
requires ample time for discussion of the affiliation question prior
to the vote,' 78 participation by nonmembers would mean opening
up union meetings and union halls to those who have voluntarily
declined the privileges associated with union membership. It
might also mean yielding the floor to statements and resolutions
of nonmembers, in violation of the constitution or bylaws of those
unions that understandably permit only members to participate in
the conduct of union business.
As a matter of equity, a certain unfairness is worked by forcing
union members to open affiliation votes to nonmembers. The deci-
sion to affiliate with a powerful international is often based on the
independent's perception that affiliation will strengthen its bar-
gaining power and add depth to its resources in the constant strug-
gle with management.17 9 The employee who takes a free ride has,
by his decision not to join, declined to participate in the affairs of
the union or to bear his share of the costs of collective bargaining.
In the very act of refusing to be counted as a member, to attend
meetings, to pay dues, or to vote for officers, stewards, strikes, or
contract ratification, the nonmember is himself a cause of the inde-
pendent's weakness that affiliation often is meant to remedy. To
allow nonmembers an equal say in these circumstances does an
injustice to union members, who have accepted the costs as well
as the benefits of collective bargaining and have earned a voice in
the internal affairs of the union.
As long as membership is open to all on a nondiscriminatory
basis, no reason appears for requiring nonmember eligibility to
vote in affiliation elections. It is, of course, ordinarily only the
employer who objects to the exclusion of nonmembers; no case on
record yields evidence of a nonmember objecting to his inability to
vote. Indeed, the cases are rare in which the vote of nonmembers
could possibly have affected the outcome. 80
The exclusion of nonmembers from the affiliation election in
Amoco, therefore, does not render the affiliation invalid. The non-
members had no statutory right to vote, nor could their numbers
178 See text accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
179Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 182, slip op. at 2-3 (Jan. 3, 1979),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1042 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978).
180 See note 4 supra.
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have affected the outcome. Even if those excluded could have
altered the result, the claim of OCAW, Local 4-14, to majority sup-
port would not thereby be undermined. Especially because non-
members were eligible to join the union until the election and no
nonmember, but only the employer, was heard to object, the limita-
tion on voter eligibility imposed by the local in Amoco should be
sustained.
CONCLUSION
Permutations in union structure have been a constant on the
labor scene for many years, as unions have responded to shifting
economic and political forces. Frequently called upon to define
the effect of union affiliations and mergers on collective bargaining,
the National Labor Relations Board has steered a pragmatic course,
adopting rules that, for the most part, leave established collective
bargaining relationships intact. By allowing the successor union to
-step into the shoes of the predecessor without undergoing the trial
of a Board-conducted election, and by requiring the successor to
honor the existing collective bargaining agreement, the Board's
approach has contributed significantly to stability in labor-manage-
ment relations, while at the same time conserving scarce adminis-
trative resources.
Such a feat has not been accomplished without some sacrifice
in candor. Operating under the mistaken belief that a change in
the identity of the bargaining representative necessarily raises a
question concerning representation and must be resolved by a de-
certification election, the Board has considered itself bound in
principle to reject any union affiliation or merger that materially
alters a representative's identity. Thus, according to the official
mythology, affiliations will be countenanced only if they preserve
"continuity of representation" and leave the bargaining representa-
tive's identity unchanged. Strict obedience to that rule, however,
would disqualify many affiliations and thereby defeat the very pur-
pose of the continuity doctrine-to preserve established collective
bargaining relationships. Cognizant of these facts, the Board has
made a mockery of its own doctrine and, in the interests of indus-
trial stability, regularly found apples and oranges to be identical.
In addition to the requirement that union affiliations preserve
continuity of representation, the Board has also insisted that the
union members involved be given the opportunity to vote on the
affiliation in an election that satisfies certain procedural standards
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of "due process." Although in theory the Board adopts a single,
flexible standard of due process review, those affiliations that achieve
a substantial change in the bargaining representative are in practice
subjected to a stricter scrutiny. Here, too, the discomfort with the
fiction of identity results in a distorted application of articulated
legal standards.
This Comment has proposed that the Board and the courts
discard the fiction of identity altogether and reconstruct the con-
tinuity of representation doctrine so that it promotes the basic
policies underlying the Act. The Board's perception that a change
in the bargaining representative's identity destroys continuity of
representation is based in part on an unduly restrictive interpreta-
tion of the statute. Contrary to the Board's belief, a question con-
cerning representation requiring the Board to conduct a decertifica-
tion election does not arise under section 9(c)(1) whenever the
bargaining representative changes, but only when the incumbent
union's majority status has affirmatively been cast into doubt. In
the typical affiliation setting, no question concerning representation
arises because the incumbent union's unchallenged majority status
carries over to the successor union by virtue of the affiliation elec-
tion. Under this reading of the Act, the Board is free to recognize
affiliations or mergers whether or not they result in a "new"
bargaining representative.
The metaphysical approach to continuity is rooted also in
common law doctrines of contract and the law of unincorporated
associations. Absorbed into federal law during the early days of
the Act, that mode of analysis has little to recommend it in the
modern statutory environment governed by the policies of employee
freedom of choice and industrial stability rather than by freedom
of contract. Examined in this light, the continuity doctrine's pur-
pose of promoting stability is fully served by two requirements--
(1) that no schism occur whereby the predecessor union remains in
existence and actively opposes the change, and (2) that the successor
union agree to honor the existing collective bargaining agreement.
Additional criteria of continuity are unnnecessary and serve to
frustrate rather than promote stability in collective bargaining.
Acceptance of this revised doctrine of continuity allows the
law of union affiliations to operate with clarity and consistency.
Once the fiction of identity is discarded as irrelevant, it is no longer
necessary to articulate one standard and apply another. The sliding-
scale approach to due process can also be jettisoned in favor of a
single but flexible standard for determining in every case whether
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the election result accurately registers the desires of the union
membership.
No issue more fully exposes the bankruptcy of the Board's
paper doctrines in this area than the eligibility of nonmembers of
the union to vote in affiliation elections. Of the four opinions in
Amoco Production Co., none is able to furnish a convincing analysis
because each relies in some way on the metaphysical approach to
continuity. Eligibility determinations in union affiliation elections
are not strictly internal union matters, as the majority view in
Amoco would have it. Rather, because affiliation may result in a
new representative, the question of eligibility involves the Act's
fundamental policy of the freedom of employees to choose their
bargaining representatives. But the Act's command that all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit be allowed to vote in a decertification
election does not necessitate the same result in the affiliation context.
Because no dispute over the incumbent union's majority status
occurs in the ordinary affiliation effort, the Act does not require
eligibility for nonmembers. Nor does the possibility that the ex-
cluded nonmembers might affect the outcome make any difference.
Consistent with the Act, the Amoco rule is favored by both
practical and equitable considerations. Requiring a majority vote
of the employees in each bargaining unit would strain union struc-
tures that do not correspond to the Board's own unit determinations,
and possibly lead to undesirable intervention in internal union
affairs. Mandatory participation by nonmembers would also im-
pinge on union self-government and would dilute the privileges
associated with union membership. Finally, a requirement of
eligibility for nonmembers is unnecessary because the interests that
such a rule seeks to protect are already served by the Act's decer-
tification procedures.
The Board's pragmatic approach to union affiliations has long
been in need of a rationale that respects both the letter and the
spirit of the Act. Whether one slights the prevailing fictions as the
Board itself has done, or takes them seriously, as has the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, the rule of law is undermined.
When, however, the continuity of representation doctrine is reduced
to its essence, freely chosen union affiliations that do no harm to
the stability of established collective bargaining relationships may
be recognized without affront to the dictates of the Act.
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